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THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
by
A. J. Thomas, Jr.*
Ann Van Wynen Thomast
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Organization of American States (OAS),' to aid in the
maintenance of the peace of the Western Hemisphere, has con-
ferred upon it a police function which is repressive in nature aimed
at preventing or removing actual or threatened breaches of the peace
through the application of effective coercive measures. Actually, the
police function of the Organization of American States is nothing
more or less than organized collective security by which each mem-
ber of the inter-American community pledges to take certain action
against any nation which commits or threatens to commit a breach
of the peace. If all member nations fulfill this pledge, it should mean
protection for a victim of aggression and probable defeat of the ag-
gressor.'
The inter-American system took a long time to evolve this police
function. It was not until the Act of Chapultepec in 1945 that a
system of collective security, similar to that now in being, was con-
summated. The Act of Chapultepec was binding only for the re-
maining months of World War II, and it contemplated its own re-
placement by means of a permanent inter-American treaty.3
In 1947 such a treaty was concluded with the signing of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance-more commonly known
as the Rio Treaty-at the end of the Inter-American Conference for
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
f Research Associate, Southwestern Legal Foundation.
' In 1948, the Ninth International Conference of American States met at Bogota and
brought about a major reorganization of the procedures, agencies, and institutions which
made up the inter-American system. The international association of American States was
named the Organization of American States (hereinafter refered to as OAS) and became
the successor in law of the Union of American Republics. Its members arc the twenty-one
American Republics voluntarily associated for the achievement of common purposes
through joint action or cooperation. The two fundamental purposes of the OAS are the
maintenance of peace and the promotion of human welfare in the Western Hemisphere.
For a discussion of the police function with reference to the United Nations, see Ross,
Constitution of the United Nations 111-12, 137-54 (1950). On the principle of collective
security through international organization and cooperation, see Levi, World Organization
71-86 (1950); Schwarzenberger, Power Politics 492-533 (2d ed. 1951).
'Inter-American Conference on War and Peace, Mexico City, Feb. 21 - Mar. 8, 1945,
Report Submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director
General 32 (1945).
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the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security.' It is this treaty
that is the heart of the Western Hemispheric system of collective se-
curity. The Charter of Bogota, which was adopted in 1948 and is the
primary constitutional instrument of the inter-American system, in-
corporates the Rio Treaty by reference in article 25, and perhaps
modifies it slightly but does not repeat its detailed provisions.' The
Rio Treaty has as its legal basis certain provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter which grant a limited competence for the maintenance
of peace and security to regional organizations such as the OAS. It
is therefore subject to the regional arrangement stipulations of arti-
cles 52-54 of the Charter of the United Nations, and its provisions
also fall within the scope of the right of individual and collective
self-defense under article 51 of that Charter in the event of armed
attack.'
II. ACTION IN THE EVENT OF ARMED ATTACK
The Rio Treaty distinguishes the obligations to be undertaken and
the procedures to be followed in the event of an armed attack and
the obligations to be undertaken and the procedures to be followed
in the event of other acts of aggression or potential threats to con-
tinental peace." Article 3 of the treaty is concerned with action in
the event of aft armed attack. After reiterating the principle that
an armed attack against an American State constitutes an attack
" The provisions of the Rio Treaty are found in Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Quitandinha, Brazil, Aug. 15 - Sept. 2, 1947,
Report of the Delegation of the United States of America 59-65 (1948). Discussion of the
treaty may be found in the following: id. at 1-42; Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Report on Results of Con-
ference, Submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director
General (1947); Blackmer, United States Policy and the Inter-American Peace System
1889-1952, 161-70 (1952); Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention: The Law and Its
Import in the Americas 183-95, 210-11 (1956); Garcia-Mora, The Law of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1951); Kunz, The
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 42 Am. J. Int'l L. 111 (1948).
a The Charter of the Organization of American States (Charter of Bogota) is set forth
in Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30 - May 2,
1948, Report of the Delegation of the United States and Related Documents, 166-86
(1948). For discussion of the Charter, see id. at 1-40.
' On the problem of regionalism and regional arrangements vis-a-vis the U.N. See
Aranha, Regional Systems and the Future of the United Nations, 26 Foreign Affairs 415
(1948); Bebr, Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 166
(1955); Liang, Regional Arrangements and International Security, 31 Transact Grot. Soc'y
216 (1946); Starke, Regionalism as a Problem of International Law, in Lipsky, Law and
Politics in the World Community 114 (1953); van Kleffens, Regionalism and Political
Facts, 43 Am. J. Int'l L. 666 (1949).
'Such a distinction was thought necessary to make the treaty fully consistent with the
U.N. Charter. It should be noted that the Act of Chapultepec made no distinction between
action to be taken upon occurrence of armed attack or other aggressions. It simply spoke of
"threats or acts of aggression." See Report of Delegation of The United States of America,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 15-16.
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against all the American States, it declares that each of the contract-
ing parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise
of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recog-
nized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. If the
attack occurs within a security zone outlined in article 4, or within
the territory of an American State, each signatory is bound to take,
at the specific request of the State attacked, such individual measures
as it may deem appropriate to fulfill its obligation to help meet the
attack until collective measures have been agreed upon. An Organ
of Consultation is to meet as quickly as possible to determine the
collective measures to be taken.' The concluding paragraph of article
3 recognizes that the defensive measures to be employed in the case
of an armed attackwithin the region or territory of an AmericanState
are limited by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that is to
say, they may be taken only until the Security Council has acted to
maintain or re-establish peace, and all measures resorted to or con-
templated by the Organization of American States under the Rio
Treaty are to be reported to the Security Council by the Council of
the OAS.
Even a cursory reading of article 3 reveals that it is deeply signi-
ficant, and yet in certain of its aspects it is obscure and its meaning
unclear.
A. The Right of Self-Defense
Article 3 builds upon the right of self-defense recognized by arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter. In an instance of an armed
attack within the region described in article 4 or within the territory
of an American State, the State subjected to the armed attack may
exercise its inherent right of self-defense in accordance with article
51. Moreover, the other contracting parties of the Rio Treaty are to
aid the victim through the use of their right of collective self-de-
fense.
s The Organ of Consultation is a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Amer-
ican Republics which have ratified the Rio Treaty (art. 11 of the Rio Treaty and art. 39
of the Charter of Bogota). It was recognized that some cases might not require a meeting
of the Foreign Ministers or permit sufficient time to convoke them. Therefore, article 12 of
the Rio Treaty empowers the Governing Board of the Pan Amercian Union to act as Pro-
visional Organ of Consultation until the meeting of the Organ takes place. The Governing
Board was changed to the Council of the Organization of Amercian States by the Charter
of Bogota. Article 52 of that Charter empowers it to serve provisionally as Organ of Con-
sultation. All member states are represented at a Meeting of Foreign Ministers and on the
Council. Article 17 of the Rio Treaty requires decisions of the Organ of Consultation to be
taken by a two-thirds vote of the ratifying States. Thus, unanimity is not required for




Neither the United Nations Charter nor the Rio Treaty clarifies
what is meant by the "inherent right of self-defense." However, at
general international law (as distinguished from treaty law known
as particular international law), this right has never been seriously
questioned; a State, like an individual, may protect itself against
an illegitimate attack, commenced or impending.9
Self-defense is a special form of self-help. It is self-help against
a specific violation of the law, the illegal use of force, not against
other violations of the law. It is the use of force by a person (in
municipal law) or by a State (in international law) illegally attacked
by another. The attack against which self-defense is permitted must
have been made or must be intended to be made by force. As such,
self-defense is that minimum of self-help which, even within a sys-
tem of collective security based on a centralized force monopoly of
the community, must be permitted. It is recognized by national law
as applicable to individuals and by international law as applicable to
nations. It is impossible for any system, national or international, to
prevent all illegal attacks upon its subjects, and in case of such an
attack if the attacked subject were in all instances forced to wait
for the enforcement authorities to take action, he would be doomed.
It is generally stated that the prerequisites for legitimate self-defense
are that the armed attack, actual or impending, must be objectively
illegal; the state exercising the right of self-defense must show a
danger direct and immediate; the defensive act must not be exces-
sive, going no farther than to avert or suppress the attack; and it
must not be continued after the needs of defense have been met. 9
Although the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty both
impose the obligation on their signatories to refrain from the use or
threat of force in their international relations," both do permit the
use of force in the event of an armed attack under the inherent right
' On the right of self-defense at international law, see Brierly, The Law of Nations 253
(2d ed. 1938); Kelsen, Principles of International Law 60-61 (1952); Lawrence, The
Principles of International Law 117-18, 121-22 (3d ed. 1909); I Oppenhem, International
Law 272-73 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1948); Ross, A Textbook of International Law 244
(1947). See also, The Case of the Neptune (1797), IV Moore's International Adjudications
372, 441-43 (1931); and The International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, cmd 6964, p. 28
(1946).
"0 Ibid. With reference to the German invasion of Norway, this Tribunal stated that
preventive action in foreign countries was justified only in cases of "an instant and over-
whelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no moment of delibera-
tion."
" Article 2, paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter charges the members to settle their dis-
putes by peaceful means, and paragraph 4 orders them to refrain from the use of force.
Article I of the Rio Treaty condemns war and enjoins the American States not to resort to
the threat or use of force. Article 2 requires such states to submit every controversy to
peaceful settlement. Article 18 of the Bogota Charter binds the American States not to
have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense.
[Vol. 13
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of individual and collective self-defense.12 General international law
permits the exercise of the right of self-defense not only in the face
of actual armed attack, but also against a threatened armed attack
when the danger is imminent. The Charter of the United Nations
attempts to limit the right of self-defense to "armed attack," but it
speaks of the right as an "inherent" right. If self-defense is an
inherent right, it implies that it is a natural right, inalienable and
incapable of being surrendered. If it is incapable of being sur-
rendered in whole, it can be reasoned that it is incapable of being
surrendered in part; therefore, in spite of the limitation of the
Charter, if it is truly inherent, the right of self-defense can still be
applied where it is permitted under general international law, not
only against actual attack, but also against a threatened aggression
where the danger is imminent.
On the other hand, it can be argued that self-defense against an
imminent threatened armed aggression under general international
law is permissive, not inherent; that the only inherent, inalienable
portion of self-defense is that action taken against armed attack, and
that, therefore, article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations does
not detract from "inherent" self-defense but merely, by implication,
prohibits permissive self-defense."
Many jurists are of the opinion that the right of self-defense
under the Charter is limited to action after an armed attack has oc-
curred." It has been pointed out that the use of the word "inherent"
is unfortunate for it equates self-defense with an unalterable natural
right. The answer to this may be that the word "inherent" as used
in the Charter is of little legal significance for, after using the word,
the Charter, irreverant of its legal meaning, seeks to alter and change
the significance of self-defense long established by general interna-
tional law. Moreover, it is contended that in municipal law self-
defense is also spoken of as a natural and thus unalterable right, but
at the same time, positive law often does alter and change its mean-
ing. Thus, these jurists conclude that the Charter does alter the
right of self-defense as it existed at general international law by
restricting it to instances where there has actually been an armed
attack by an aggressor, and an imminent armed attack is thought
" U.N. Charter art. 51; Rio Treaty art. 3; Charter of Bogota art. 18.
"
3 See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 123-28 for discussion of the right
of individual self-defense under the U.N. Charter.
" Kelsen and Beckett, for example, are of the view that the right of self-defense under
the charter is limited to action after an armed attack has occurred. Beckett, The North
Atlantic Treaty 13 (1950); Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 791 (1950). Kunz
also takes this position in a comment, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 872, 878 (1947).
1959]
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not sufficient to invoke the right under article 51 of the United
Nations Charter.
Actually the best that can be said about the right of self-defense
under article 51 is that it is susceptible of varying interpretations;
its wording is both ambiguous and confusing. Armed self-defense
is definitely permitted against an armed attack, but the picture is
hazy as to whether self-defense is permitted against an imminently
dangerous aggression.
The Rio Treaty does little to clarify what is meant by the "in-
herent" right of self-defense. It simply recognizes in article 3 that
such a right exists. However, it is extremely doubtful if an Amer-
ican State bound by the Rio Treaty could legally justify action taken
on the ground of self-defense in its broader meaning under general
international law, i.e., taken to meet an impending or imminent at-
tack. The Organization of American States has established a govern-
ing rule on this point in the Report of the Investigating Committee
of the Organ of Consultation concerned with the Haiti-Dominican
Republic Affair. It was stated in this report:
Furthermore, The Committee is convinced that the treaties and agree-
ments in force among the American States, in assuring the integrity
of these States and their defense in case of any aggression, have estab-
lished the measures and the organs required to meet the needs of
collective self-defense; and it is evident that the American States have
formally condemned war and have undertaken to submit every con-
troversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settle-
ment. The Committee holds, therefore, that the attitude of any
American Government resorting to the threat or use of force even
on the grounds of self-defense, in any manner inconsistent with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Rio de Janeiro
Treaty, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and
without having made every reasonable attempt at peaceful settlement,
constitutes a violation of the essential norms of inter-American relation-
ships.15
In an impending or imminent attack, there would in many instances
be time for further attempts at peaceful settlement, and certainly
the right of self-defense under this interpretation cannot be utilized
as a provocation. Moreover, in cases where there is not an actual
armed attack but only an impending one, even where the danger is
direct and immediate, article 6 of the Rio Treaty permits a State to
request the Organ of Consultation to meet to take action to assist
it where the inviolability or integrity of its territory, its sovereignty,
1511 Annals of the OAS 231, 252 (1950). See also discussion of this principle, III
Annals of the OAS 11 (1951).
[Vol. 13
COLLECTIVE SECURITY
or its political independence is affected by any act of agression other
than an armed attack, any extracontinental or intracontinental con-
flict, or any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace
of America.
It can hardly be reasoned that an American State would be justi-
fied in taking matters into its own hands to precipitate conflict in
the face of impending attack when it can request collective action
by the Organization of American States to meet the threat. If this
reasoning is correct, an American State can vindicate action under
the authority of self-defense only in the presence of an actual armed
attack."6
B. The Right of Collective Self-Defense
Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty then grants a right of
individual self-defense to a State or States subjected to an armed at-
tack. It also confers a right of collective self-defense upon the
States which have ratified the treaty, and at the same time imposes
upon such States an obligation under certain conditions to take
measures to assist the injured party in the exercise of the inherent
right of collective self-defense.
An obligation of collective self-defense comes into being in two
stages under the Rio Treaty. When an armed attack is launched
within the territory of an American State or within the security
zone established by the treaty, the contracting parties have not only
a right but also a duty to take measures to assist in meeting the
attack upon request for aid by the victim. The requirement that aid
must be requested by the injured party was included in the treaty
to prevent possible simulated aggression which might occur under
the guise of conferring aid upon a victim of a supposed attack. 8
In this preliminary stage following an armed attack and a request
for aid, each State is free to determine the immediate measures which
it will individually take, although the obligation to assist in some
"6See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 129-30.
17 It has been said that no duty of individual self-defense is imposed, probably on the
ground that an obligation cannot be created which would force a person or a state to
defend himself or itself against attack. Kunz, for example, says that there is a right but no
duty of individual self-defense, op. cit. supra note 4, at 115. But article 3 declares that each
one of the contracting parties (which would include any American State subjected to
attack) "undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense .. " Quaere, do these words spell out an obligation?
It is so stated in Report of the Delegation of the United States of America, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 21. It can be argued that an attack on any State of the hemisphere creates such
a danger to the peace that all States, including the attacked State, are obligated to meet it,
such obligation not being for the protection of the victim alone, but for the protection
of all.
1s Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 34.
1959]
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way is entirely clear. In the selection of measures to be taken at this
time, the States are limited to those listed in article 8, that is, dip-
lomatic or economic measures or the use of armed force.19 The nature,
time, and extent of the immediate measures is left to the complete
discretion of each party.
The second stage of collective self-defense in the event of an
armed attack begins with the convening of the Organ of Consulta-
tion which is enjoined to meet without delay to examine the im-
mediate measures of assistance which have been taken by the in-
dividual States and to agree upon collective measures to be taken.
Under the Rio Treaty the consultation was originally to be initiated
at a request of a ratifying State to the Governing Board (now the
Council of the OAS)." This procedure has been modified by the
Charter of Bogota which requires a meeting to be called immediate-
ly by the Chairman of the Council in the event of an armed attack
within the territory of an American State or within the delineated
security zone.21 In this more advanced stage, the obligation is placed
upon the member States to consult in case of an armed attack in
order to agree upon collective measures. Thus the Rio Treaty places
a double obligation upon its signatories, that of individual assistance
and that of consultation. After the Organ of Consultation agrees
upon collective measures, the parties are obligated to comply with its
decision22 although the measures which each State is required to take
need not be of the same type and nature for all the American States."
This decision on the collective measures ends the duty of the parties
to take individual measures, but it would not terminate the right of
the victim State or the member States to continue to take such meas-
ures in the exercise of the right of individual and collective self-de-
fense; the right to continuing collective self-defense actions, of
course, being dependent upon a continued request for assistance from
the victim. Such measures would be in addition to those measures
ordered by the consultative organ."
In this consultation on collective measures, decisions are to be
taken by a two-thirds vote2 which is binding on all parties including
those not concurring, except that no State is required to use armed
'
91 Id. at 40-41.
20 Rio Treaty art. 13.
21 Bogota Charter art. 43.
22 Rio Treaty art. 20.
23 See Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 34.
24 See Report of Delegation of The United States of America, op. cit. supra note 4, at
22; Blackmer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 168.
2 Rio Treaty art. 17.
[Vol. 13
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force without its own consent.'" In other words, a party to the Rio
Treaty may be required to take part in a number of specific steps,
such as complete interruption of economic relations with the ag-
gressor, even though it did not originally favor such action. It may
not, however, be required under the treaty to use armed force with-
out its consent. Nevertheless, if the Organ of Consultation decides
that the situation necessitates the use of armed force as a measure of
collective self-defense against an armed attack, each member State
has the legal right, although not the duty, to use armed force.
Collective self-defense as sanctioned by article 51 of the United
Nations Charter is a new term to international law, for under gen-
eral international law no right of self-defense exists with reference to
an armed attack upon another state unless two or more nations are
simultaneously attacked by the same aggressor. 7 It has been argued
that collective self-defense should be interpreted as collective de-
fense; that is, that the United Nations Charter recognizes that a
State attacked by armed force has a right of self-defense and that
other states have a right to come to its assistance." But it can be rea-
soned that the Charter takes notice of the fact that there is a very
close integration and solidarity between certain nations and estab-
lishes a new rule of particular international law, namely, that an at-
tack on one nation is equivalent to an attack on other nations inte-
grated with it. 9 In that case any action aiding a State attacked by
armed force is not in the nature of assisting the attacked state, but
is action to protect the peace and safety of the assisting State. The
Charter gives to such action the name of collective self-defense.
Neither interpretation would automatically lead to the conclusion
that the right of action is inherent; it can therefore be inherent only
because the Charter bestows upon it the characteristics and requisites
of being inherent.2 "
Since article 51 of the United Nations Charter speaks of the right
of individual and collective self-defense in the same context and
without defining either, it could be assumed that the legal meaning
of collective self-defense would be similar to the meaning of indi-
vidual self-defense under general international law with, of course,
the major differentiation that measures of collective self-defense are
' Rio Treaty art. 20.
27Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 245 (1954) declares categorically that
no right of self-defense exists by reason of an armed attack upon a third state.
" Kunz, op. cit. supra note 14, at 872.
"
9 See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 169.
so On collective self-defense under the U.N. Charter, see Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 14,




to be taken by a nation or nations not directly under armed attack.
Is the extent of the right and limitations of collective self-defense
then to be determined by the right of individual self-defense as it
exists under general international law? In reality the new concept
creates certain problems of its own, and the application of the rules
established by general international law with reference to individual
self-defense may not always follow.
As has been noted, collective self-defense is action taken by States
not directly the victims of an armed attack. It is action taken on be-
half of another State subjected to the attack. This in itself is a modi-
fication of the concept of self-defense as it exists at general inter-
national law. It is generally assumed that the exercise of the right of
self-defense involves the use of physical force to repel an illegal at-
tack.31 Does collective self-defense connote the use of armed force
only? If so, measures taken against an armed attack which do not
involve the use of armed force should not properly be labelled self-
defense. If this is so, under the Rio Treaty it becomes erroneous to
speak of an obligation of collective self-defense at either the preli-
minary stage when resort is to be had to individual measures or at
the secondary stage when the Organ of Consultation decides on col-
lective measures, for in neither stage are the American Republics
bound to use armed force. The Rio Treaty would then only estab-
lish a right, as distinguished from a duty, of collective self-defense.
Such an interpretation equating collective self-defense only with
the retaliatory use of armed force creates difficulties and confusion,
for the possibility exists that such an interpretation would prevent
the OAS and its members from using measures of a nature less than
armed force, e.g., economic or diplomatic measures, inasmuch as the
United Nations Charter declares that only measures of collective
self-defense and no other collective enforcement measures may be
taken by members of the United Nations and regional organizations
without Security Council approval. The requirement of such prior
approval might well rule out all unarmed collective measures in the
face of an armed attack if those other measures are considered to be
enforcement measures."
Although the meaning of collective self-defense is not clear under
the United Nations Charter, under the Rio Treaty collective self-
defense includes not only armed force but also other measures of an
economic and diplomatic character as set forth in article 8 of that
treaty. Article 3 declares that in the preliminary stage the parties
31 Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 9, at 60; Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 792.
'"But see pp. 204-06 infra on the measures as "enforcement measures."
[Vol. 13
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may determine the immediate measures to be taken in fulfillment of
the obligation of collective self-defense. Thereafter the Organ of
Consultation shall meet to agree on measures of a collective character
that should be taken. Article 8 lists the collective measures which the
Organ of Consultation may use, including the recall of chiefs of
diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of
consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic re-
lations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-
telephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; plus the use of armed
force. Therefore, it is apparent that the measures other than the use
of armed force are considered as measures of collective self-defense
by the Rio Treaty.
When the prerequisite for the application of collective self-defense
arises (the occurrence of an armed attack) all collective measures,
whether by armed force or otherwise, must be considered measures
of collective self-defense, and their use must be legitimate under
article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and under article 3
of the Rio Treaty until the Security Council acts by taking measures
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Thus, under the Rio Treaty, there is an obligatory duty of collective
self-defense at both stages in case of armed attack, for the parties
to the treaty are immediately obligated to take some individual meas-
ures, and thereafter the Organ of Consultation must agree upon the
measures of a collective character to be taken, this decision being
binding upon the parties with the sole exception that no State shall
be required to use armed force without its consent.
Both the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty limit the
exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense to in-
stances of an armed attack. General international law adds a further
qualification by specifying that self-defense may only be exercised
in the case of an illegal armed attack, that is, against the illegal use
of armed force. This element of illegality of the armed attack, al-
though not specifically stated in either the United Nations Charter
or the Rio Treaty, must nevertheless be applied thereto in those docu-
ments. The right of individual or collective self-defense cannot be
exercised against a legal use of force."3 From the very purpose of the
United Nations, a right of self-defense cannot exist against a legal
enforcement action by that organization. 4 Should that body be
forced to resort to armed force against a recalcitrant nation, such
action is the action of the international community against which





self-defense is not allowed. The same is equally true of a legitimate
use of force as a measure of collective self-defense or enforcement
by the members of the Organization of American States upon a valid
decision of the consultative organ or, in the first stage of collective
self-defense, when one American State comes to the aid of another
which is the victim of the armed attack.
Article 9 of the Rio Treaty declares that an unprovoked armed
attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea,
or air forces of another State may be characterized as aggression. The
use of the term "unprovoked" is unfortunate, for by reading article
9 in conjunction with article 3, one might come to the conclusion
that no right of self-defense exists if one State provokes another
State to the point of armed attack, for in that case the provoked
State would not be an aggressor. This is not the fact. The United
Nations Charter prohibits the use of force in all instances except
under article 51. Neither a provoked nor an unprovoked State has
the right to use force unless the State is provoked to such use in the
right of self-defense by an illegal armed attack against it. The use
of force except in pursuance of a right of self-defense is illegal."
The element of an armed attack is essential for an exercise of the
right of self-defense, individual or collective. There must be an
armed attack against a victim State before it can resort to individual
self-defense or before other States can come to the victim's aid. Arti-
cle 9 of the Rio Treaty in setting out acts which, in addition to
others, may be characterized as aggressions, declares that the follow-
ing shall be considered as such:
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the
people, or the land, sea, or air forces of another State;
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an
American State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated
in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or,
in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a
region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State.
This language indicates that the armed attack must be made by a
State directed against the territory, people, or armed forces of an-
other State." This might raise a question of whether or not an at-
"See Alfaro, Memorandum on the Question of Defining Aggression, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1951, vol. II, U.N. Doc. No. A/cN.4/L.8 at p. 36 where
he criticizes the use of the word "unprovoked" as introducing into the determination of
the aggressor the "vague, imprecise, and uncertain element of provocation."
as See id. at 37-38, where Alfaro defines "force" which would comprise "armed attack":
The term force is used in a broad sense to signify any elements at the disposal of States
which are capable of destroying life and property, or of inflicting serious damage. It
comprises land, sea and air forces, regular armies as well as irregular bands and any
and all kinds of weapons, contrivances, explosives, toxic or asphyxiating gases, employed
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tack on a merchant vessel or a civil aircraft could be equated to ag-
gression since article 9 mentions various branches of the armed serv-
ices. But such attacks could clearly be armed attacks or aggression
for article 9 does not claim to be exclusive as it states that these list-
ed acts "in addition to other acts" may be characterized as aggres-
sion.
Little argument can be mustered for the view that collective self-
defense can be exercised against a threat of imminent armed attack.
Collective self-defense must be limited to actual attack. As previous-
ly mentioned, perhaps the right of individual self-defense, if it is
truly an inherent right, cannot be limited to armed attack by the
United Nations Charter. If individual self-defense is inherent at gen-
eral international law, all elements of the right, inclusive of its ex-
ercise against a threatened armed attack if imminent, must be ac-
ceptable under the Charter. But collective self-defense is a new term
which was created and made inherent by the Charter itself. Since
the right did not exist at general international law, no valid argu-
ment can be made that it cannot be restricted by the agency which
created it. And that agency, the Charter, does restrict it to instances
of armed attack.
Self-defense in municipal law, as well as in international law, is
not designed to enforce the law. It is not meant to be a form of self-
help to punish the aggressor or to obtain reparations. It serves only
to repel an attack. As such is its purpose, general international law
requires that it be not excessive, that it not go beyond the necessity
to avert or suppress the attack, and that it must cease after the needs
of defense have been met. There is no reason why these requirements
of proportionality and the restrictions against unreasonableness and
excessiveness should not apply also to the right of self-defense under
the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty. 8 But the wording
of these instruments is obscure on this point.
for the destruction of life and property in land, naval air, chemical or bacteriological
warfare.
He goes on to say in defining armed aggression against the territory and people of States
or governments:
Aggression is bound to be conceived as perpetrated against the territory and against
the people under the jurisdiction of the State victim, and aimed at the submission or
destruction of any forces opposing resistance to the aggression. This aim implies the
possibility of destroying life and property, a destruction of which the victim is the
people of the State attacked. Aggression against the territory and the people of a State
or government must comprise any acts of violence perpetrated against its land, sea or
air forces, or against its vessels or aircraft, whatever their character; or against struc-
tures vital to public life and health, as for instance, water works and protective dams;
or against the whole of the population, through the use of any weapons or the com-
mission of any acts likely to endanger combatants and non-combatants.
aSee also id. at 36.
as Kunz is of the opinion that the requirements of proportionality and reasonableness
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As self-defense is permitted against any illegal armed attack, the
right could be claimed and exercised against a frontier incident of
small import."' Furthermore, since no limitation is presented in either
treaty, the force used as a repellent in the exercise of the right of
self-defense might well be excessive in relation to the armed attack
which acted as the catalyst, and this excessiveness might of itself
bring about serious hostilities. It may also be possible for self-defense
to go beyond a mere repulse of the attack. Article 3 of the Rio
Treaty not only permits but also requires measures to be taken upon
the occasion of an armed attack until the Organ of Consultation
agrees upon collective measures. These measures may, in each in-
stance, include the use of armed force. Even after the consultative
organ agrees to the collective measures, each State may continue
taking measures of individual and collective self-defense including
the use of armed force, for the right of self-defense is not terminated
by the decision of the Organ of Consultation. Furthermore, the Or-
gan of Consultation may decide that armed force is the collective
measure that must be taken as a reaction against the armed attack.
Then, each American State has a right, although not a duty, to use
armed force until the Security Council of the United Nations has
taken measures to maintain international peace and security. If the
Security Council is paralyzed from acting, as by use of the veto
power for example, then it would seem that measures of self-defense
may continue indefinitely. If requirements of reasonableness, pro-
portionality, and non-excessiveness are removed, the right of in-
dividual and collective self-defense may degenerate into a major war.
Despite these possible defects surrounding the exercise of the right
of self-defense, some improvement has been made in relation to the
right established by the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty
over the right as it existed at general international law. At general
international law, the final decision as to whether self-defense is ex-
ercised legally within principles surrounding its legitimate exercise
often rests with the unilateral will of the individual State. Under
the Charter and the Rio Treaty, a State resorting to self-defense does
not possess the legal faculty of remaining the ultimate judge of the
justification of its action. Individual States as well as fellow treaty
signers have the right, upon request of the victim, to decide in the
first instance as to whether they are in the presence of an armed
attack calling for armed resistance, but this right is subject to some
are lacking from the right of collective self-defense under article $1 of the U.N. Charter.
See Kunz, op. cit. supra note 14, at 877-78.
39 Id. at 876.
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control and their actions are accountable to a higher authority.
Without doubt the Organ of Consultation of the OAS may deter-
mine whether or not there has been a legitimate use of the right of
self-defense, and if it decides in the negative, it could issue a call for
cessation of hostilities. If this is disobeyed, the Organ of Consulta-
tion could order measures to be taken against the State or States act-
ing illegally under the color of the right of self-defense. Even if the
Organ of Consultation should find that there has been a legitimate
use of the right of self-defense, the Security Council of the United
Nations can also pass judgment on whether recourse to the right of
self-defense was justified by the circumstances and whether the ex-
tent of the action was warranted. Nevertheless, its judgment, even
if handed down by a majority of its members, could be valueless if
one of the veto-bearing nations chose to overrule the decision of the
majority. Under such circumstances, the regional organization and
the member States thereof could continue to exercise the right of
self-defense.
C. Geographical Limitations
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty makes no distinction in principle be-
tween an armed attack from inside the hemisphere and an armed
attack from without the Western Hemisphere. ' Article 3 refers to
all cases of armed attack against an American State without differ-
entiating between an American or a non-American aggressor. Never-
theless, article 3 does require that when resort is to be had to its
procedures and obligations the armed attack must occur within cer-
tain geographical limits no matter whether it originated from an
American or a non-American source. The first paragraph of this
article is generous in stating that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against
all the American States which will bring into being the right of in-
dividual and collective self-defense. Paragraph three of this article
declares that the provisions of article 3 are to be applied in case of
any armed attack which takes place within the region described in
article 4 or within the territory of an American State, but when the
attack takes place outside of these areas, the provisions of article 6
shall be applied.
The language employed leads to the conclusion that the provisions
40 It may be noted that there was some agitation at the Conference for the Maintenance
of Continental Peace and Security that distinctions should be drawn between obligations
and procedures in case of aggression by a non-American State against an American State
and those in the event of aggressions between American States. See, e.g., proposals by the
Argentine delegation, the Venezuelan and Peruvian Delegations, Report of the Delegation
of the United States of America, op. cit. supra note 4, at 17.
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of article 3 are applicable when an armed attack by any State oc-
curs against the territory, the people, the armed forces, etc., of an
American State within the region described in article 4. This region
may be said to correspond to what the contracting parties believe to
be the Western Hemisphere. However, an armed attack by any State
against the territory of an American State outside the hemispheric
security zone also brings into operation the procedures, the rights,
and the duties of article 3. An armed attack against Hawaii, for
example, which lies outside the security zone but which is the terri-
tory of an American State would come under the provisions of
article 3. It should be stressed that under this latter type situation,
where the attack takes place outside the described region, the armed
attack must be directed against the territory of an American State.
An armed attack of another nature outside the security zone will not
come under article 3, but will fall under article 6.
When speaking of an armed attack against an American State,
article 3 makes no distinction between American States which are
members or which are not members of the Organization of American
States. In all instances measures of collective self-defense are to be
taken by the ratifying States. An American State such as Canada here-
under receives certain benefits even though it is not a member of the
OAS and even though it has not signed the Rio Treaty. If Canada
were subjected to armed attack against its territory or within the
security zone, it could request the other American States as ratifiers
of the Rio Treaty to come to its aid. And there is an obligation on
the part of the other American States immediately to take measures
to aid this non-member victim and to consult and agree on further
collective measures to be taken against the aggressor. '
The region described in article 4 covers the territory of some
non-American States and vast stretches of the seas surrounding the
Western Hemisphere. As paragraph 3 of article 3 declares that the
provisions of that article are to be applied in the case of any armed
attack which takes place within the delineated security zone, there
has arisen the question of whether the obligation of collective self-
defense by the contracting parties to the Rio Treaty arises when a
non-American State is subjected to an armed attack within this
region, e.g., would an armed attack against a European colony in
41 See pp. 210-11 infra concerning the Rio Treaty and non-members. Kunz declares speci-
fically that in case of armed attack within the region the Rio Treaty applies even though
the attack is against a non-member such as Canada. Kunz, op. cit. supra note 4, at 116.
See also in this respect, Radio Address by Senator Vandenberg, Sept. 4, 1947, 17 Dept.
State Bull. 502, 504. For discussion, see Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110,
157-60, 170-72, 178-79, 188.
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the Western Hemisphere call article 3 of the Rio Treaty into play?
There can be little dispute that an armed attack within the de-
scribed region creates a special hazard to the peace and security of the
continent and to all the American States which are members of the
OAS, whether that armed attack occurs against an American or a non-
American State. Consequently, the position has been taken that an
armed attack within the region against a non-member, or non-
American State brings into operation the obligations and procedures
of article 3." Little difficulty is realized in reconciling this view with
general international law or with article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Under general international law, it has long been recognized
that parties to a treaty can confer benefits upon third states not
signatory to the document. Moreover, under article 51, there is no
requirement that collective self-defense be based upon a treaty
arrangement. If collective self-defense is equated with collective
defense, then under article 51 whenever a State is illegally attacked
by an armed force it has a right of self-defense, and other states have
a right to come to its assistance. Such an interpretation would ob-
viously permit the contracting American States to come legally to
the assistance of a non-American State under illegal armed attack.
On the other hand, if collective self-defense means that there is a
close integration between certain nations so that an attack on one
amounts to an attack on others integrated with it, then, under arti-
cle 51, the integrated nations can come to the assistance of the at-
tacked State to preserve their own sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Under this interpretation of collective self-defense, the American
States could act to aid a non-American State attacked within the re-
gion even if they had not previously provided by treaty that an
attack against all States, American or non-American, within the re-
gion would be equivalent to an attack against all of the contracting
parties. All that would be required would be an integration between
the nations, and the fact that a non-American State had territory
within the designated security zone would seem to be sufficient proof
of such integration permitting assistance by the American States in
all cases of illegal armed attack within the area."
Although such a line of reasoning seems to remove any possible
obstacle to American collective self-defense to aid a non-American
victim of an illegal act of armed aggression within the region, diffi-
42 See Address by Senator Vandenberg, supra note 41; Kunz, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 116. See also Report of the Delegation of The United States of America, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 21; Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 36.43 See note 41 supra.
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culties still are encountered with the terminology of article 3 which
in some respects fails to make clear the intention of the contracting
parties.
In the first place, paragraph 1 of article 3 declares that an armed
attack by any State against an American State is an attack against
all the American States, and in such event the parties to the Rio
Treaty agree to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense. This language would
seem to limit the right of self-defense insofar as the Rio Treaty is
concerned to an attack against an American State. It can be argued
that the broad language of paragraph 3 of article 3 which covers
any armed attack which takes place within the region must be read
in conjunction with paragraph 1; that is, that any armed attack re-
fers only to an armed attack against the territory of an American
State within the region or against the people, the land, sea or air
forces of an American State. Such an interpretation would lead to
a construction that article 3 is not applicable in case of an attack
against a non-American State unless the attack took place against
the people or the forces of an American State within the territory
of a non-American State, e.g., if it were an attack against the United
States forces in Greenland. Under this approach an attack against
the territory of a non-American State within the region, or an at-
tack against the people or forces of a non-American State within the
region (e.g., upon a British battleship within the region) would not
bring the provisions of article 3 into operation.
Another semantic difficulty here encountered is that paragraph 2
of article 3 requires that the preliminary measures of collective self-
defense be subject to a request from the State or States directly at-
tacked. If the words "State or States" relate back to paragraph 1,
then it must mean only American State or States, and it is question-
able if a non-American State could under such interpretation request
and obligate American States to take immediate collective measures.
Of course the language of the treaty permits a meeting of the
Organ of Consultation in the case of an armed attack against a
non-American State within the region, for paragraph 2 calls for
such a meeting without delay to agree upon measures of a collective
character, and article 43 of the Charter of Bogota (the primary
constitutional instrument of the OAS) specifically requires the chair-
man of the Council to call such a meeting immediately in the case
of an armed attack within the territory of an American State or
within the region of security. The calling of such a meeting is not
contingent upon the request of an American State.
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In view of these obstacles raised by the wording of the Rio Treaty,
it would seem that for measures of collective self-defense to be taken
on behalf of a non-American State under the treaty, one must con-
clude that paragraph 3 of article 3, referring to any armed attack
within the region, materially modifies the first two paragraphs of
the article to the extent that an armed attack against any State with-
in the region, be it American or non-American, must be considered
as an attack against all. This would support the conclusion that the
phrase "on the request of the State or States directly attacked" sig-
nifies either an American or a non-American State.
Jurists have reached the conclusion that article 3 is applicable in
the event of an attack against a non-American State within the re-
gion;" nevertheless, it must be admitted that the intention of the
parties was imperfectly expressed and argument can be made pro or
con either view. The best that can be said is that article 3 is sub-
ject to varying interpretations in this respect and no definite answer
can be forthcoming until the consultative organ clearly defines its
powers upon presentation of an actual case.
Article 3 does create a limitation, geographical in nature, on its
operation, for it does not apply to armed attack outside the security
zone and outside the territory of an American State. This limitation
was based upon the idea that an armed attack outside the region
and not on the territory of an American State would not create such
an immediate and direct danger to the hemisphere as to require in-
dividual assistance by all the American nations prior to consultation.
As has been stated in this respect:
Outside the zone armed attack, which would necessarily be upon the
land, air, or sea forces of an American State, would allow time for
consultation, as would be true in cases that are not armed attack, but
other types of aggression or threat of aggression, and consequently for
agreement upon measures that should be taken to assist the victim of
the aggression. There is a practical reason for this conclusion: the
American States may have, and in fact some do have, international
military obligations in zones far distant from their own mainland or
island possessions, and may find themselves involved in incidents whose
gravity cannot be determined at first, even by the State that has ap-
parently suffered the aggression. There it could happen that a mistaken
interpretation of the facts would lead the other American States to
offer assistance that would be out of proportion to the gravity of the
incident, and that might even be greater than the State directly at-
tacked would expect. Or it might happen that an incident initially




become a much more serious threat, which could not be evaluated ex-
cept by a formal explanation of the facts to the other States bound by
solidarity. Prior consultation is obligatory in that case, and the Treaty
made it so. Armed attack within the geographical security zone, on
the other hand, does not present that uncertainty, in the first place;
in the second place, it is so great a threat to collective security that,
without prejudice to the procedures later outlined in consultation, it
would be necessary to take individual measures immediately in defense
of the victim. 5 (Emphasis added.)
The geographical limitation is not of great moment. It does re-
lieve the contracting parties of the obligation of collective self-de-
fense in the preliminary stage, i.e., of the duty to take immediate
individual measures to aid the victim of an armed attack upon the
victim's request. The right of individual self-defense still exists for
the State subjected to the armed attack outside the zone; the right
of collective self-defense in the preliminary stage would still exist
if other American nations chose to take action to aid the victim of
armed aggression; and both a right and a duty of collective self-
defense arise at the next stage of collective activity, for article 6 of
the Rio Treaty requires an immediate meeting of the Organ of Con-
sultation to agree on measures which must be taken to assist the vic-
tim of an aggression. These measures may legally include the use
of armed force or measures of an economic or diplomatic nature
and the signatory States are bound to take the measures so pre-
scribed except that no State can be required to use armed force
against its will.
III. ACTION IN THE EVENT OF OTHER SITUATIONS
WHICH MAY ENDANGER THE PEACE
The second type of situation contemplated by the Rio Treaty is
concerned with an act of aggression which is not an armed attack, an
extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or other fact or situ-
ation that might endanger the peace of America, provided that such
aggression, conflict, fact, or situation affects the inviolability, or the
integrity of the territory, or the sovereignty or political independ-
ence of any American State. When such situation arises, under arti-
cle 6, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to
agree upon the measures which must be taken in the case of aggres-
sion to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the main-
tenance of the peace and security of the continent.
43 Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 37.
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Under the Charter of the United Nations, collective self-defense
is not limited to regional arrangements for it stands by itself in arti-
cle 51, which stipulates that "nothing ...shall impair the inherent
right of ... collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs . .. ."
Although the Rio Treaty was drawn up mainly with reference to
article 51, it must be remembered that it is also an integral part of
a regional arrangement and must conform with provisions of arti-
cles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter." Article 51 permits col-
lective and individual self-defense only in the case of armed attack,
but the Rio Treaty also provides for measures against aggressions
which are not armed attack. In case of aggression which is not an
armed attack, the Organization of American States is not free to
take those measures in the exercise of collective self-defense which
it would be free to take in cases of aggression that constitute an
armed attack. The use of force in the event of an aggression is a
prerogative of the United Nations and not of the inter-American
system except with respect to the right of self-defense against armed
aggression.
Take the following hypothetical case as an example. American
State A complains to the Council of the Organization of American
States that American State B is in the process of committing an ag-
gression against A which does not consist of an armed attack but
which threatens the inviolability or the integrity of the territory
or sovereignty or political independence of A. Under the Rio Treaty
all signatories are duty-bound to meet in consultation in order to
agree on the measures which must be taken to assist the victim. The
Rio Treaty makes no reference to obtaining Security Council ap-
proval in this instance.
Article 52, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter commits the mem-
bers of the United Nations to make every effort to achieve pacific
settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or agen-
cies, but article 53 declares that "no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without
the authorization of the Security Council."
If, in the hypothetical case set out above, after having explored
all peaceful methods of settlement such as conciliation or arbitration
and having failed, the consultative organ determines to take action
against State B under article 8 of the Rio Treaty which sets forth
the coercive measures such as economic and diplomatic measures and
46 See p. 178 supra on regional arrangements.
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the use of armed force, can the OAS take action under the Rio
Treaty without violating the UN Charter?
If the Organ of Consultation orders only measures relating to
economic or diplomatic relations, in other words "peaceful" meas-
ures, and if the term "enforcement action" mentioned in article 53
of the Charter refers only to the use of armed or physical force,
then probably the OAS need not request authorization of the Se-
curity Council to take such measures, for article 52, paragraph 3
of the Charter permits "pacific settlement of local disputes through
such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on
the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Se-
curity Council." '47 But should the Organ of Consultation of the
OAS decide that the unarmed aggression of American State B against
American State A can be stopped only by force of arms, it is then
clear that authorization of the Security Council of the UN is re-
quired. Such authorization can come about only when all the per-
manent members of the Security Council refrain from using the veto.
This means that a permanent member of the Security Council from
outside the area where the regional arrangement applies, and one
not party to the regional agreement, is able to prevent such action
from being taken even though a two-thirds majority of the mem-
bers of the OAS is in favor of such action and even though all other
members of the Security Council may favor it.
Although the United Nations Charter is specific in saying that
no regional arrangement or agency may take "enforcement action"
without the authority of the Security Council, it would appear logi-
cal to assume that in the light of the Uniting for the Peace Resolu-
tions passed in 1950,48 the General Assembly of the United Nations
may call upon disputing States to settle their disagreements through
the use of a regional agency or arrangement if the Security Council,
because of the barrier of the veto, is unable to act when a threat to
the peace or an act of aggression occurs. The Uniting for the Peace
Resolutions are broad enough to permit the General Assembly to
authorize the members of regional pacts or agencies to undertake
"action" at its request. These resolutions stated that in the event of
a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
which the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among its
permanent members, failed to stop by taking necessary action, the
General Assembly would consider the matter immediately with a
47 See pp. 204-06 infra.
4s See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 173. See also McDougal and Gard-
ner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 Yale L.J. 258 (1951).
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view to making appropriate recommendations to members for col-
lective measures including measures of force. The issue of the le-
gality of these resolutions was resolved with the reasoning that the
whole United Nations organization, and not the Security Council
alone, was responsible for the maintenance of the peace of the world;
that the resolutions were legal under the provisions for collective
self-defense; and that although the Charter does limit the powers
of the General Assembly, it does not limit its competence, for it is
given competence in the whole field which the Charter covers. The
General Assembly is limited to discussion and recommendation, but
it is not limited as to the extent of its discussion or as to the type
of recommendation it may make.
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty also covers extracontinental or intra-
continental conflicts or any other fact or situation that might en-
danger the peace of America and requires the signatories to meet in
consultation in order to agree upon measures which should be taken
for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and
security of the continent when such situations arise. Here again,
the Rio Treaty makes no reference to obtaining approval for the
measures upon which it decides from the Security Council. But
where in instances of aggression (either armed or unarmed) the Rio
Treaty establishes a legal obligation to assist the victim, in the case
of situations or conflicts which might endanger continental peace
but are other than actual aggressions, only the duty to consult arises,
and the taking of other measures appears to be optional with the
Organ of Consultation of the OAS. Nevertheless, all signatory States
are under the obligation to accept decisions of the Organ of Con-
sultation49 with respect to the application of measures in cases of
situations other than aggressions with two exceptions: the Organ of
Consultation cannot require the use of armed force without author-
ization from the Security Council, except perhaps under the Uniting
for the Peace Resolutions; and even with such authorization, no
State is required to use armed force without its consent."
In summation, the provisions of article 6 of the Rio Treaty be-
come operative in the following hypothetical cases:
(1) Armed attack by any State against an American State out-
side the delineated Security zone and not within the territory of an
American State;
(2) Aggression which is not an armed attack whether inside or




outside the hemispheric zone provided such aggression affects the
"inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence of any American State"; and
(3) An extracontinental or intracontinental conflict or any
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the
Americas, whether within or without the security zone and again
provided that the inviolability or the territorial integrity or the
sovereignty or political independence of any American State is
affected.
Under hypothesis (1), an obligation to consult is placed upon the
parties followed by an obligation to agree upon measures to aid the
victim, for the Organ of Consultation is required to meet immediate-
ly and it must take collective measures if it finds an armed aggres-
sion affecting the sovereignty, etc., of any American State. Under
hypothesis (2), there also arises the duty to consult immediately and
to agree upon measures which must be taken to aid the victim. But
under hypothesis (3), only a duty to consult arises, and the taking
of other measures appears to be optional with the Organ of Consul-
tation.
The meaning of the word "aggression" becomes a matter of prime
importance in cases involving hypothesis (2). Although great con-
troversy exists as to its meaning at international law, the Rio Treaty
tries to avoid a dispute over this issue by article 9 which set forth
two unquestionable examples of aggression and declares that the
Organ of Consultation is empowered to characterize other acts as
aggression. The two examples set forth by article 9 are unprovoked
armed attack against the people, or the land, sea, or air forces of a
State, as well as invasion of the territory of a State by the armed
forces of another State. Even though there is confusion in interna-
tional legal terminology as to the exact extent of "aggression," there
is agreement that its definition would include at least the illegal use
of or threat to use armed force by one State against another."5 It is
evident from the terms of article 9 that the Rio Treaty recognizes
that the actual illegal use of armed force is an aggression. Moreover,
since the Rio Treaty condemns not only the actual use of but also the
threat to use armed force, and since general international law
recognizes that aggression includes the threat to use force, it reason-
5' For discussion of the problem of aggression and its definition, see Stone, Aggression
and World Order (1958); Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 514,
526 (1956). See also on the question of defining aggression, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1951, vol. II, Documents of the third session including the report of the
Commission to the General Assembly, pp. 28-42, 131-33.
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ably can be assumed that a threat of force is an aggression which is
not an armed attack and falls under hypothesis (2).
To limit aggression only to these instances, however, is too narrow
an approach. There have been great refinements in the techniques of
aggression in the first half of the twentieth century, and the trend
appears to be to wipe out the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of a State by means far more subtle than armed force
or even a threat of force." Thus, use of or threat of armed force
cannot be said to exhaust acts which the consultative organ may
characterize as aggression. Except for the examples contained in the
Treaty, it provides no rules or criteria as to what constitutes aggres-
sion inasmuch as its drafters felt that the Organ should be left free
to characterize acts as aggressions when confronted with the facts of
a particular case. Hence there is nothing to prevent the Organ of
Consultation from extending the concept to acts of States which are
often called "indirect aggression" such as the fomenting of civil
strife in other nations through the use of hostile propaganda, fifth
columns, infiltration of the political parties of the nation sought to
be destroyed, or the organization, encouragement, or toleration of
armed bands operating against another state, as well as interventions
by means of economic or political coercion in order to obtain
advantages."'
Indeed, it seems that the Organ of Consultation has equated agres-
sion to intervention which has been vigorously condemned by inter-
American treaties (see, for example, articles 15 and 16 of the Charter
of Bogota), for in the second case involving a dispute between Haiti
and the Dominican Republic, the Council of the OAS, acting as a
provisional organ of consultation, faced with facts involving inter-
vention by certain Caribbean States in domestic revolutionary situ-
tions in other States declared:
Even though the said facts fortunately did not result in the violation
of international peace, they did very seriously weaken American soli-
darity; and if they were to persist or recur, they would give occasion
for application of the procedures of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance [the Rio Treaty] in order to protect the
principle of non-intervention and to ensure the inviolability or the
integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or the political independ-
" See Gould, An Introduction to International Law 606 (1957); Stone, op. cit. supra
note 51, at 58-61, 66-68. But see, Wright, op. cit. supra note 51, at 526-27, who is of the
opinion that aggression only ensues with the use of armed force or threat thereof.
" Yearbook of International Law Commission, op. cit. supra note 51, at 126.
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ence of any American State against aggression on the part of any
State or group of States." (Emphasis added.)
The Secretary General of the Organization of American States in
his Annual Report for 1949-1950 stated in this connection:
Actually, this affirmation creates nothing more nor less than the teeth
that were lacking in the inter-American treaties and conventions
which, in the Committee's judgment, were violated in the cases it
investigated. It is almost the same as saying that intervention, as con-
demned in those treaties and conventions, is one of the acts of aggres-
sion that give occasion for applying the measures contemplated by the
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. No future meeting of the Organ of
Consultation, in similar cases, could fail to be guided by this criterion
if there should be any doubt as to the application of the Rio de Janeiro
Treaty, or if it should be necessary to define the aggressor in the cir-
cumstances covered by Articles 6, 7, and 9 of that Treaty. Indeed,
the Council was acting under the power of Article 9, which authorizes
it to characterize acts other than armed attack and invasion as acts of
aggression. 5
Situations which fall under the third type of hypothetical cases
gives rise only to the duty to consult on the part of the signatories
of the treaty. No duty is created by which the parties are required
to take collective measures prior to consultation. As the consultative
organ is required to meet and agree upon measures which should be
taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of hem-
ispheric peace, it can well be argued that if the Organ agrees that
the situation warrants the taking of measures, the parties to the
treaty are required to carry out the Organ's decisions, unless, of
course, that decision involved the use of armed force. The Organ
of Consultation could not legally request measures involving the use
of armed force without United Nations authorization except in
hypothesis (1) where the right of collective self-defense arises
automatically. Hypotheses (2) and (3) would generally require the
the application of measures not involving the use of armed force.
IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES To BE TAKEN
Article 8 of the Rio Treaty enumerates measures which are to
be taken by the member States individually or on which the Organ
of Consultation may agree in cases of aggression or threats thereof.
These measures are quite similar to those listed in article 41 of the
Charter of the United Nations except that article 8 adds as a
" Pan Amercian Union, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance 1948-1956, p. 126 (1957).
"III Annals of the OAS 10-11 (1951).
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measure the use of armed force which under the United Nations
Charter was dealt with separately in article 42. The measures ap-
plicable for purposes of the Rio Treaty are: the recall of chiefs of
diplomatic missions; the breaking of diplomatic and consular rela-
tions; the partial or complete interruption of economic relations or
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic
or radiotelegraphic communications; and the use of armed force.
When the Organ of Consultation decided by a two-thirds vote" to
employ any or all of these punitive measures, each of the contracting
parties is required to carry out the decision even though it may have
voted against the measure, with the exception that no state is re-
quired to use armed force without its consent. The Organ of Con-
sultation is confined in all instances but one to agree upon these
specified measures."
However, in the case of a conflict among American States, without
prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, the consultative organ is re-
quired by article 7 of the Rio Treaty to call upon the contending
States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the statu quo ante
bellum. Although the Rio Treaty makes no fundamental distinction
between an American or non-American aggression, a special proce-
dure is provided in article 7 in case of such an inter-American con-
flict. The reason for this distinction is simple; in case of a non-Amer-
ican attack launched against a nation of this hemisphere, an order
by the Organization of American States to suspend hostilities and
restore matters to the statu quo ante bellum would in all probability
prove completely unsuccessful. There is little that can be done other
than to meet the attack in the exercise of individual and collective
self-defense. On the other hand, when conflict occurs between Amer-
ican States so closely bound together, it is within the realm of pos-
sibility that an order from the Organ of Consultation would induce
a cessation of hostilities even after a resort to armed force."
This order to suspend hostilities and restore matters to their former
position is called by article 7 a pacifying action. If it fails, the Organ
of Consultation may, of course, apply collective measures. Moreover,
the rejection of the pacifying action "will be considered in deter-
mining the aggressor and in the application of the measures which
s Rio Treaty art. 17; see discussion contained in note 7 supra.
m Rio Treaty art. 20.
" See Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 40-41; and Report of
the Delegation of the United States of America, op. cit. supra note 4, at 26-27.
59 Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 42; Report of Delegation
of the United States of America, op. cit. supra note 4, at 27.
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the consultative meeting may agree upon." This language of the
article engenders some confusion. If, for example, hostilities occur
between American State A and American State B and it is clear be-
yond all doubt that State A was the original aggressor, obviously a
rejection of the pacifying action by A would bring about determina-
tion that A was the aggressor all along. But suppose B rejects the
pacifying action, would it be branded as the aggressor? The language
of article 7 in this respect only makes sense in a situation where there
is doubt as to just which State, A or B, is the aggressor. In an equiv-
ocal situation the Organ in its consideration would, naturally, be
influenced by a rejection of the pacifying action, and that rejection
could well tip the scales toward consideration of the rejectee as the
aggressor. Nevertheless, it cannot be conclusively presumed that in
all instances an American State (engaged in hostilities with another
American State) which rejects the order to suspend hostilities will
automatically be named the aggressor."
Article 7 also requires the consultative organ, after calling for a
suspension of hostilities, to "take in addition all other necessary meas-
ures to re-establish or maintain inter-American peace and security
and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means." Hereunder
wide authority is given to the organ as to the peaceful measures it
may take. If the situation so warrants, particularly in the event both
parties heed its orders to cease hostilities, the organ of consultation
could seek to induce the parties to resort to methods of peaceful set-
tlement such as negotiation, arbitration, or conciliation.
It is obvious that for purposes of the Rio Treaty, the measures
listed in article 8 are enforcement in nature. They are collective co-
ercive measures to be taken to maintain the peace of the Western
Hemisphere. The measures involving the use of armed force, as well
as those of diplomatic or economic nature, are measures necessary
to make effective the decisions of the Organ and to repel an armed
attack for purposes of article 3, or to repel aggression and to pro-
vide for the common defense and the peace and security of the con-
tinent for purposes of article 6.6" These are measures by which the
Organ, through commands to the contracting parties, seeks to en-
force its decisions upon States breaching or threatening to breach
the peace of the Americas. In reality, these measures are nothing
more or less than coercive measures of a system of hemispheric col-
lective security.
6' Garcia-Mora, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14, criticizes article 7 and declares that it
seems to have been added as an afterthought.
" See, e.g., Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 724, where he characterizes such measures
under the U.N. Charter as enforcement measures.
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Measures taken in pursuance of the right of collective self-defense
in case of an armed attack are, practically speaking, regional collec-
tive enforcement action against a State committing the attack. No
real difficulty as to the nature of these measures is here encountered,
for article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits measures to be
taken in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense until the
Security Council takes the necessary steps to maintain peace and se-
curity.
Difficulty does exist, however, as to whether measures can ever be
taken by the Organization of American States without approval of
the Security Council in cases arising under article 6 where there is
no armed attack. Here, no right of collective self-defense would exist
under article 51 which speaks only of armed attack. Furthermore,
article 53 of the United Nations Charter declares that "no enforce-
ment action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by re-
gional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."
Clearly this would prohibit the use of armed force in the face of
an aggression or situation which is not an armed attack, unless the
Security Council authorized it. But could the OAS call on its mem-
bers to use measures of diplomatic or economic coercion in this situ-
ation? This would depend, to a great extent, upon the exact defini-
tion given to "enforcement action" as used in article 53 of the UN
Charter. 2 In this connection, the Report of the Director General of
the OAS on the Rio Conference stated:
In the Charter of the United Nations there are two types of measures,
closely coordinated with the procedure to be followed in the Security
Council when faced with threats of aggression, with the refusal of the
States to comply with the recommendations of the Council, or with a
breach of the peace. The first type is that of Article 41, according to
which the Security Council is empowered to decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect
to its decisions, and it is empowered to call upon the members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. But if these measures are or
have proved to be inadequate, coercive measures will next be applied,
with the use of air, sea, or land forces. There is a clear distinction for
the reader of the Charter between the measures of Article 41 (enforce-
ment action) which are not coercive, in the sense that they lack the
element of physical violence that is closely identified with military
action, and those of Article 42. Enforcement action, with the use of
physical force, is obviously the prerogative of the Security Council,
with a single exception: individual or collective self-defense. But the
62 Kelsen would apparently say that all such measures of a coercive nature are enforce-
ment measures; hence, measures of a diplomatic or economic nature as well as of armed
force would be forbidden by article 53. Kelsen op. cit. supra note 14, at 327, 724.
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other measures, those of Article 41 are not; it may even be said that
it is within the power of any State-without necessarily violating the
purposes, principles, or provisions to the Charter-to break diplomatic,
consular, and economic relations or to interrupt its communications
with another State. 3
Therefore the Director General of the Organization of American
States concluded that measures not involving physical violence can
at any time be legally employed by the OAS without violating the
provision of the United Nations Charter requiring that all "enforce-
ment action" by a regional organization or agency be taken only
under the authorization of the Security Council."4
V. MEASURES AS SANCTIONS
Can the measures which are to be taken under article 6 of the
Rio Treaty be regarded as sanctions-actions on the part of the in-
ter-American community taken against a delinquent State which
has violated the law? It is a generally accepted principle of general
international law that sanctions are permitted only to uphold or
enforce the law as a reaction against a State guilty of a breach of
the law."3 This qualification must, of necessity, refer to the applica-
tion of sanctions by a single nation as well as to collective sanctions
by an organization under an international treaty. That being the
case, any treaty providing for enforcement measures in the nature
of sanctions, if it is to be interpreted as being in conformity with
general international law, can only stipulate that the enforcement
measures to be taken must be taken against conduct by a nation or
nations which constitutes a breach of international law. Otherwise
the treaty cannot be held to be in conformity with general inter-
national law." This does not mean to imply that only conduct which
is prohibited or proscribed by general international law can be the
object of legal sanctions, for a breach of international law may oc-
cur when a nation does not fulfill its obligations which are set forth
in a treaty; that is, there may be a breach of particular international
law (treaty law) as well as of general international law.
6" Report on Results of Conference, op. cit. supra note 4, at 41-42.
64 Such reasoning, of course, reaches a rather anomalous result in that measures meant
to be of an enforcement and coercive character under the U.N. Charter when taken by the
Security Council are not so considered when taken by a regional agency like the OAS.
65 See Hindmarsh, Self Help in Time of Peace, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 315 (1932); Kelsen,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 22-23.
6 Treaties are one method used to bring about a change in the general international
legal relationships between the signatories. Our inquiry here is not related to the legality of
the measures established by the treaty, but seeks merely to discover whether or not the
measures in these particular treaties fall within the sphere of true sanctions.
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Article 1, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter clearly sti-
pulates that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to "take
collective measures ... in conformity with the principles ...of
international law." Consequently, any enforcement measures, wheth-
er by armed force or by other means, when taken by the United
Nations must comply with the requirements set up for sanctions
under general international law. The actions must be taken as meas-
ures to uphold the law, as a reaction against a State guilty of a breach
of law. Yet it can be questioned if all the collective enforcement ac-
tions permitted under the Charter can fulfill the requirements of
true sanctions, for the Charter makes no clear stipulation that en-
forcement action is permitted only against a State or States guilty
of a breach of the law. Since the Charter appears to contain no rule
that the Security Council must definitely take action against the
nation which is legally wrong, it has been deduced that the Security
Council is free to decide against whom the enforcement action shall
be directed, and it may take into consideration all surrounding fac-
tors, e.g., the legal rights of the parties involved, the deeper sub-
stantial rights of those parties, and the most practical means of end-
ing the situation speedily. It is conceivable that coercive measures
may be directed against both contending parties at once. As a re-
sult it is often thought that the enforcement measures taken by the
Security Council under the authority of the UN Charter may not
fulfill the requirements of true sanctions."
While this issue presents some problem under the UN Charter,
it would seem that the measures of the inter-American community
are sanctions, although of course they may not be taken against all
violations of law, but only against certain violations of the law. It
should be remembered that the particular treaty law of the Americas
prohibits the use of sanctions (interventions) by individual states,
but it does not prohibit their use by the OAS acting within the
terms of the Rio Treaty."
The Rio Treaty was drafted in such a manner that it qualifies
both as a regional arrangement under chapter 8 of the UN Charter
and as a part of collective self-defense under article 51.'9 Measures
taken under article 3 of the Rio Treaty hardly can be considered
67 See Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 724.
0' See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 140. But see criticism by Kunz of
the authors' concept of measures of the OAS as having a limited character of sanctions.
Kunz, Book Review, S0 Am. J. Int'l L. 974 (1956).
" See note 5 supra. See also, Padilla, The American System and World Organizations,
24 Foreign Affairs 199 (1945); Reid, Regionalism under the United Nations Charter, 419
Int'l Council 123 (1946).
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sanctions inasmuch as self-defense is self-help against the illegal use
of force, not other violations of the law, and is exercised only to
avert or suppress the attack. On the other hand, the object of sanc-
tions is to obtain redress or reparation from the wrongdoing State,
to force a return to legality, to avoid new offenses, and to uphold
or vindicate international law.
Technically, the measures exercised in the right of collective self-
defense seem similar to sanctions, particularly if they are considered
as measures to uphold or vindicate the law. However, such a view
does not appear to be the correct view of collective self-defense
under either the UN Charter or the Rio Treaty. Collective self-
defense is not a right to intervene to uphold or vindicate the law
as such. It, like individual self-defense, may be exercised only against
an illegal attack and not in instances of all violations of legally pro-
tected interests of a victim state. Too, the Rio Treaty declares that
an attack against one American State is an attack against all, thus,
those States coming to the aid of the attacked State apparently are
to be considered as repelling an attack against themselves. Self-de-
fense, whether individual or collective, must, as in municipal law,
stand alone both under the Charter of the UN and under article 3
of the Rio Treaty. Self-defense cannot be termed a sanction to up-
hold the law, it is merely that minimum of self-help by a victim
permitted by any legally organized community to repel an attack
until the lawful authorities can take over; it is up to the lawful
authorities to sanction the attacker.
Under the Rio Treaty, therefore, sanctions must relate to enforce-
ment measures taken in pursuance of article 6, that is in situations
not involving illegal armed attack. Moreover, since armed force may
not be used in such situations by the Organization of American
States without the consent of the United Nations, armed force as
a sanction is for the most part ruled out.
Article 6 envisions certain types of situations-aggressions which
are not armed attack, extracontinental or intracontinental con-
flicts, and other facts or situations that might endanger the peace of
the Americas. In the case of aggressions which are not armed attack,
the OAS is to take measures to assist the victim of aggression if that
aggression affects the inviolability or the integrity of the territory
or the sovereignty or political independence of an American State.
Although, as has been pointed out, the term "aggression" has many
disputed definitions in international law, whatever definition is
chosen, an aggression is still an unlawful act under general inter-
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national law, and consequently any measures taken by the OAS
to assist the victim of aggression would automatically be measures
against the nation breaching international law and would qualify as
true sanctions.
Under the other types of situations foreseen by article 6, the Or-
gan of Consultation shall meet in order to agree on measures which
should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance
of the peace and security of the continent. In instances of this na-
ture, the Organ of Consultation need not take action against the
nation legally in the wrong. It might be claimed that whatever meas-
ures are employed here would not be sanctions, for they would not
seem to be measures to uphold the law, but rather would seem to be
measures of common defense and to maintain the peace and security
of the continent. But under article 2 of the Rio Treaty, the signa-
tories undertake to submit every controversy which may arise be-
tween them to methods of peaceful settlement. Hence, if a fact or
situation arises between two American States, they are under a legal
duty to settle the issue peacefully, and if they fail to do so with the
result that their failure or refusal brings about a threat to the peace
of the Americas, any measure which the Organ of Consultation de-
cides upon, even though applicable to both nations, would be in the
nature of true sanctions applied against nations violating the parti-
cular international law established in the Rio Treaty.
If one of the nations agrees to settle the dispute or controversy
by peaceful means, and the other nation refuses, then the final por-
tion of article 7 comes into play to the effect that the rejection of
the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the
aggressor. And here too, any measures applied by the Organ of Con-
sultation would then be in the nature of sanctions. Moreover, if both
States refused the pacifying action, it would be possible to label both
States as aggressors and to take collective action in the nature of
sanctions against both.
If such an intra-American conflict occurs between an American
State and a non-American State, or between two non-American
States within the hemispheric zone, the matter is not so clear. It can
well be argued that in a situation where it becomes necessary to
utilize measures against non-members threatening to breach the
peace within the region, such measures could not be called sanctions
to enforce the law, but must be measures for the maintenance of
hemispheric peace and security. On the other hand, the Charter of
the United Nations definitely creates a legal duty for all its mem-
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bers-which include most of the nations of the world-to settle
their disputes by peaceful means in a manner which does not en-
danger international peace and security."' If a member State of the
UN violated this duty, then the whole international community has
a right to act jointly against the State breaking the law, and it would
seem that the whole international community could be represented
by a smaller unit, such as a regional organization like the Organiza-
tion of American States, permitting it to sanction the law-breaking
nation.7
As to an extracontinental conflict which is an aggression or other
situation between two non-American States outside the security zone
but disturbing the peace so as to affect the territorial integrity or
political independence of an American State, it can be contended
that measures taken by the consultative organ are simply measures
to defend the continent and maintain its peace and security and not
measures to enforce the law, for in the case of an aggression, the
right to repel such an aggression would be within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United Nations.7" But again, the extracontinental
aggression or threatened breach of the peace would be a violation of
the treaty law laid down in the United Nations Charter, and here
as well as in the situation above, the regional organization could re-
present the larger organization so its measures might be equated to
sanctions against a violation of the law if that violation affected the
members of the regional organization.
If the measures of the Rio Treaty can under the outlined situa-
tions be regarded as sanctions, it must be emphasized that they are
sanctions of an extremely limited scope applicable against only cer-
tain violations of the law. They are to be applied only where there
is involved an aggression or other situation bringing about a breach
of the obligation to settle disputes peacefully or a breach of the obli-
gation to refrain from breaking or threatening to break internation-
al peace.
VI. THE Rio TREATY AND NON-MEMBERS
The Rio Treaty was drafted in such a manner as to affect third
states not parties to the agreement. As mentioned before, article 3
confers benefits or rights on all American States, whether such States
ratified the treaty or not, whenever an armed attack occurs against
"o U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
" See Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 159-60.
72See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11 n.61.
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an American State.73 Morever, article 3 probably confers benefits on
non-American, non-member States when an armed attack occurs
against such states within the security zone, for the contracting
parties felt that any armed attack within the region creates such a
danger to all the American States that it warranted defensive ac-
tion." Under article 6, if any American State is subjected to an
aggression which is not an armed attack, the other American States
are obligated to consult and agree on measures to aid the victim. No
distinction is created between contracting or non-contracting parties.
The sole requirement is that the victim be an American State."3
A customary rule of general international law is found in the
adage pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt-treaties do neither harm
nor good to third parties."6 According to this principle, a treaty
concerns only the contracting parties, and, as a rule, imposes no
rights or duties upon third States not parties thereto inasmuch as
it would be incompatible with the equality of sovereign States that
parties to a treaty should be able to bind third States in any manner
without their consent. Nevertheless, international law has slowly
come to the realization that many treaties do affect relations of third
States, although courts and writers cautiously warn that the practice
is so unusual that "such results cannot be lightly presumed."77
Today, it is generally accepted that it is legally possible for con-
tracting States to create rights in favor of third States if the inten-
tion of the contracting parties to do so is very clear. Controversy
does exist, however, as to the exact nature of the right so conferred
and the obligations of the contracting parties. Although Kelsen
declares that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon a non-contract-
ing or non-consenting State because this would do violence to the
principle of sovereignty or equality of States,"8 this rule would not
apply to a treaty which only conferred rights upon a third State
without exacting obligations from that State." Signatories of a treaty
may by the terms thereof be legally bound to live up to the rights
7 3 Supra pp. 192-95.
74 Ibid.
" If the consultative organ took action in the case of an extra or intracontinental
conflict or any other fact or situation endangering the peace of the Americas, it might be
that such action would aid a non-member; the action would not in such an instance be
taken to aid a victim, but to provide for the common defense and for the maintenance of
the peace and security of the continent.
6 Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law 68 (3d ed. 1952).
7' Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
194 (2d ed. 1941). See also Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 9, at 345; Thomas and Thomas,
International Treaties 64 (Monograph 1950).




which the treaty conferred upon the third State, and such is the
case as to articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty where the contracting
parties conferred stipulated benefits upon non-signatory States.
Nothing in the United Nations Charter prevents this, for measures
of collective self-defense under article 51 need not be based upon a
treaty arrangement, and the benefits of such collective self-defense
may be bestowed upon a non-contracting American State subjected
to an armed attack or to any non-contracting State subjected to an
armed attack within the delineated security zone. Under article 6 of
the Rio Treaty, if a non-ratifying American nation is subjected to
an unarmed aggression, the measures of the Organ of Consultation
are not taken under the collective self-defense provisions of article
51 of the UN Charter, but under the regional arrangement provi-
sions which give the regional agency the power to act within the
region and does not confine the grant of power to action only within
the regional agency or arrangement." Of course, measures involving
the use of armed force are not conferred hereunder without the con-
sent of the United Nations.
In a certain sense, the Rio Treaty imposes obligations upon non-
contracting parties, that is, a duty seems to be incumbent upon all
States not to commit armed attack against any American State or in
fact against any State within the security zone, nor to commit aggres-
sions which are not armed attacks or other acts which endanger the
peace of the Americas and which affect the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, or political independence of an American State. If such
situations occur, collective measures will be taken by the OAS under
the right of collective self-defense to aid the victim of aggression and
repel the aggressor or to provide for the common defense and for
the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent."1 Under
the Rio Treaty, no distinction is made as to whether the delinquent
State, the disturber of the peace, against whom the measures may be
taken is a ratifying or non-ratifying State. Even though benefits
may be conferred upon third States, it can be questioned whether
a treaty can impose obligations upon non-contracting parties, and
it might well be questioned whether enforcement measures can be
taken against non-ratifying parties.
If the Rio Treaty stood alone, difficulties might well be en-
countered when attempting to justify the legality of measures taken
by the OAS under the fact situations it was designed to cover. But
"°Thomas and Thomas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 170-71, 178-79.
" See discussion pp. 183-191, supra, on self-defense under article 3, and for discussion
falling under article 6, see pp. 195-201, supra.
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these difficulties vanish in view of the fact that the Rio Treaty is
buttressed by the United Nations Charter signed by most of the
nations of the world. That Charter makes the use of force illegal
and places a duty upon its signatories to settle their disputes peace-
fully and not to breach or threaten to breach the peace.' As article
51 of the Charter establishes the right of collective self-defense in
case of an armed attack, recognizing the principle that an attack
against one State is an attack against all other States closely inte-
grated with it, any action taken by a regional agency or arrange-
ment against a non-contracting nation guilty of an armed attack
in the described region is legal under the rules of the United Nations
Charter. A nation which is a signatory of the UN Charter has
bound itself to obey the injunctions of the Charter and consented
to the right to be subjected to the exercise of collective self-defense
on the part of other nations should the nation breach the treaty.
Under the Rio Treaty, the right to take measures against non-
ratifying States does not stop with measures relating to collective
self-defense, for measures can also be taken against non-contracting
aggressor States or States disturbing the peace of the continent under
article 6. The right to enforce this section of the Rio Treaty against
non-signatories is derived directly from article 52 of the United Na-
tions Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
All ratifiers of the United Nations Charter thereby agree to the pos-
sibility that they may become subject to regional arrangements or
agencies dealing with matters within the region relating to the main-
tenance of international peace. The United Nations Charter estab-
lishes no prerequisite that a nation within a particular region must
be signatory to the pact establishing the regional arrangement or
agency. The only prerequisites are that the matter must be ap-
propriate for regional action, and the action taken must be consis-
tent with the purposes and principles of the UN. By ratification
of the United Nations Charter, a nation falling within a region in
which there is a regional arrangement or agency has indirectly given
its consent to intervention by that agency in matters in its region
relating to the maintenance of peace.
82 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3-4.
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